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RECENT DECISIONS
ment of peace among those engaged in armed conflict in the Chaco, as
a standard of guidance for the President in his ascertainment of fact
and proclamation thereof. Hence, the act is also sustainable in accor-
dance with the doctrine of stare decisis.
A.F.
CONTRACTS-IMPLIED CONDITIoN-ATTORNEY'S FEEs.-Plain-
tiff rented a talking-picture machine to defendant for use in the latter's
theatre for a period of ten years at a fixed rental, the entire sum to
be paid during the first two years. No proision was made for the
termination of liability for the agreed compensation in the event of
the destruction of the theatre. The defendant could assign this con-
tract, which in fact he did, provided he remained liable as a guarantor.
The contract further provided for recovery of attorney's fees incurred
by plaintiff in collection of rent. Approximately seven months after
the start of the contract period a fire destroyed the premises but left
uninjured the equipment. Upon the request of the defendant's as-
signees the plaintiff removed the machine from the theatre ruins and
has held it for defendant's use. In an action for rent the plaintiff re-
covered the entire balance of the consideration for the ten-year period
plus an arbitrary sum of five hundred dollars for attorney's fees. De-
fendant appealed on the ground that the continued existence of the
theatre during the term of the agreement was an implied condition to
his liability and that the destruction of the theatre and the voluntary
removal and retention of the apparatus by the plaintiff ended all lia-
bility. Held, affirmed, in part. No condition will be implied where
such a condition might have been provided against in the contract.'
The value of attorney's fees, however, in absence of stated amount in
contract, must be recovered on a quantum ineruit basis, and the lower
court was in error in granting an arbitrary figure. General Talking
Pictures Corporation v. Rinas, 248 App. Div. 164, 288 N. Y. Supp.
266 (1st Dept. 1936).
,Subsequent or intervening impossibility of performance, as a de-
fense, should be clearly distinguished from impossibility arising at the
time the contract is made, for in the latter instance the contract may
be avoided in some cases on the ground of lack of consideration, if
the consideration is obviously and on the face of the contract impos-
sible or in other cases on the ground of mutual mistake of fact.2 It
is with the former problem that we are now concerned. The general
rule is that a contracting party is bound by the unconditional promise
he has made even though performance becomes impossible by reason
'Harnony v. Bingham, 12 N. Y. 99 (1854).
21916 F. L. R. A. 10; Beebe v. Johnson, 19 Wend. 500 (N. Y. 1838).
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of circumstances beyond his control.3 Where the contract calls for an
act possible in itself, the performance is not excused by inevitable ac-
cident or unforeseen contingencies. 4 To remedy the glaring injustices
which would arise in some instances if such a precept were rigidly
enforced resort has been had to the doctrine of implied conditions.
Certain' contracts 1 might show in their inherent nature that it
was contemplated when made, that their fulfillment would be depen-
deftt upon the continuance or existence at the time of performance of
certain persons or things. In these cases a condition is implied that
the impossibility of performance arising from the perishing of the per-
son or thing shall excuse performance.6 The implied condition is a
part of the contract as if it were written into it and by its terms fur-
ther performance is excused if the subject matter is destroyed without
the fault of either of the parties before the time for complete per-
formance has arrived.7 The court refused to bring the instant case 8
within this class of contracts and has laid down the broad rule that
where a condition might have been provided against, liability continues
in absence of such a provision. Most certainly such language is too
general, for we have numerous cases 9 where the courts have termi-
nated liability though the conditions which might have been provided
against were not inserted in the written contract. The court was prob-
ably motivated in this case 10 by the fact that though the contract pro-
vided that the happening of certain specified events, such as the bank-
ruptcy of lessee, etc., would terminate the contract, destruction by fire
was not among the enumerated exceptions." In Harmony v. Bing-
ham,'2 where an agreement provided for certain conditions and omit-
3 Harmony v. Bingham, 12 N. Y. 99 (1854).
Where a party is prevented by act of God from discharging a duty created
by the law, he is excused. But where he engages unconditionally by express
contract to do an act, performance is not excused by inevitable accident or
unforeseen contingencies not within his control. Wheeler v. Connecticut Mut.
Life Insurance Co., 82 N. Y. 543 (1880).
'WHITNEY, CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1934) 255.
'Taylor v. Caldwell, 3 B. & S. 826 (Q. B. 1863) ; People v. Bartlett, 3 Hill
570 (N. Y. 1842).
Part Anz Quilles L. Co., Inc., v. Meigs P. W. Co., Inc., 204 App. Div.
541, 198 N. Y. Supp. 563, (1st Dept. 1923); Dexter v. Norton, 47 N. Y. 62
(1871); Gabler v. Evans Laboratories, 129 Misc. 911, 223 N. Y. Supp. 408
(1927).
'Butterfield v. Byron, 153 Mass. 517, 27 N. E. 667 (1897).
'General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Rinas, 248 App. Div. 164, 288 N. Y.
Supp. 266 (1st Dept. 1936).
9 Nitro Powder Co. v. Agency of Canadian Car & Foundry Co., 233 N. Y.
294, 135 N. E. 507 (1922); Kirkpatrick Home for Childless Woman v. Kenyon,
206 App. Div. 728, 199 N. Y. S. 851 (4th Dept. 1923).
" General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Rinas, 248 App. Div. 164, 288 N. Y.
Supp. 266 (1st Dept. 1936).
" See p. 29, 30 of Records on Appeal from Judgment and Order.
'Harmony v. Bingham, 12 N. Y. 99 (1854).
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ted others, it was held 13 that the parties excluded the conditions not
specifically mentioned.
Where a particular building is specified in a contract merely for
the sake of convenience and it is in truth immaterial whether or not
the work is to be done there, destruction of that building will not ex-
cuse performance since there was no inherent impossibility of per-
formance in the contract. 14 This does not contravene the doctrine that
destruction of the building or other means of performance which is
necessary by the terms of the contract or within the contemplation of
both parties discharges the duty to perform.' 5
It is well to keep in mind that it is the function of the courts to
interpret contracts and they are loath to make them for individuals.
As has been aptly said "where a person has expressly agreed to do an
act in a contract of his own drawing and neglected to insert a clause
(express condition) saving himself from liability for non-performance,
in case a foreseeable contingency arises the law should not imply a
condition for his own protection which by his own carelessness he
failed to insert in the contract." 16 The court may not inject into a




CRIMINAL LAw-CoNSTITUTIONALITY OF NEW YORK'S "ALIBI
STATUTE." I -Section 295-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure pro-
vides, that if a person indicted by a grand jury intends to offer testi-
mony establishing his presence elsewhere than at the scene of the crime
at the time of its commission, he must, when demanded by the prose-
cuting attorney, file a bill of particulars not less than eight days before
'Standard Oil Co. of N. Y. v. Central Dredging Co., 225 App. Div. 407,
233 N. Y. Supp. 279 (3d Dept. 1929); Texas Co. v. Hogarth Shipping Co.,
256 U. S. 619, 41 Sup. Ct. 612 (1921).
" Booth v. Spuyten Duyvil Rolling Mill Co., 60 N. Y. 491 (1875) ; Hefferon
v. Neumond, 198 Mo. App. 667, 201 S. W. 645 (1918).
Stewart v. Stone, 127 N. Y. 500, 28 N. E. 595 (1891).
"WHITNEY, CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1934) 260; Amer. Central Ins. Co. of St.
Louis v. McHose, 66 F. (2d) 749 (C. C. A. 3d, 1933); Public Schools of
Trenton v. Bennett, 27 N. J. L. 513 (1859); Krappman Whiting Co. v. Middle-
sex Water Co., 64 N. J. L. 240, 45 Atl. 692 (1900) ; Foley v. Mfg. Fire Ins.
Co., 152 N. Y. 131, 64 N. E. 318 (1897) ; Tompkins v. Dudley, 25 N. Y. 272(1862). In contracts to build entire structures failure to insert a clause reliev-
ing from liability, not only disables contractor from collecting compensation
for a partially erected building which has been destroyed by fire but renders
him liable for damages for non-performance if he fails to replace the building
on time.
'American Central Ins. Co. of St. Louis v. MVfcHose, 66 F. (2d) 749
(C. C. A. 3d, 1933).
'N. Y. Laws 1935, c. 506.
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